pilgrimage-portal-clientnpm
Advisory published Updated
pilgrimage-portal-client is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-13453) that opens a backdoor for remote access (malicious version 99.0.0). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in pilgrimage-portal-client (npm)
What this malware does
On npm install, the package's postinstall hook runs node ping.js, which reads the installer's hostname via require('os').hostname() and POSTs it, along with a timestamp and the package name/version, to the hardcoded bare-IP endpoint http://134.119.222.10:9009/canary over plain HTTP. Errors and timeouts are silently swallowed. The version number (99.0.0) and beacon shape are consistent with a dependency-confusion proof-of-install callback: the destination is a non-first-party bare IP the installer never configured, and the outbound call fires automatically without user consent. Regardless of the 'canary' self-label, host-identifier data leaves the installer's machine to an attacker-controlled endpoint at install time.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Backdoor / remote accessFind it
Search your lockfiles and build artifacts for pilgrimage-portal-client (version 99.0.0).
If you installed it — respond
pilgrimage-portal-client establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.
Did it already run?
If pilgrimage-portal-client was installed, its post-install payload may already have run. Removing the package does not undo that — check outbound connections and credential use from the install window onward.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- ReversingLabs · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks pilgrimage-portal-client-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the C2 callback and severs the channel.