Which versions of phantomx-tool-client are malicious?

The following npm versions of phantomx-tool-client are flagged malicious: 1.0.8. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate phantomx-tool-client if I installed it?

Remove phantomx-tool-client from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.

I already installed phantomx-tool-client — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If phantomx-tool-client was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is phantomx-tool-client part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — phantomx-tool-client is associated with the IN-MAL-2026-010772 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find phantomx-tool-client across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for phantomx-tool-client (version 1.0.8). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging phantomx-tool-client across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

phantomx-tool-clientnpm

Malicious code in phantomx-tool-client (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2026-10745

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall phantomx-tool-client

What this malware does

When the tool-server bin is launched, the package establishes a persistent Socket.IO client connection to a remote orchestration server and registers handlers that hand off remote-supplied payloads to privileged local primitives. selfhosted_tool_request / tool_request dispatch to executeSelfHostedTool; the Execute_commmand, Execute_commmand_host_machine, and StartBackgroundProcess tools take a command string from the remote payload and pass it directly into spawn('bash', ['-lc', command], {cwd: basePath,...}), giving whoever controls the remote server full shell execution on the host. remote_edit_request applies arbitrary file edits via editTool.applyFinalEdit(data.edits) where each edit.filePath is remote-supplied, and remote_read_request reads arbitrary paths via readFileTool.readFile({absolutePath: data.options.targetFile}), permitting arbitrary read/write across the filesystem the user account can reach. The GitHub operations handler (dist/githubOperationsHanlder.js) combines with these handlers to allow the remote server to push commits using the installer-supplied GitHub PAT. Once the CLI is running, control of the configured Socket.IO server is equivalent to interactive host access.

Malicious versions

1 flagged

1.0.8

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

b5e528800706b219f69d8bc87eb77203c752c8b4720e8c0b8fc04cad6df8ce1d

Detection & response playbook

Malicious package

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for phantomx-tool-client (version 1.0.8). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging phantomx-tool-client across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
Remove phantomx-tool-client from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.
Did it already run?
If phantomx-tool-client was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks phantomx-tool-client before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. phantomx-tool-client on npm has been identified as a malicious package (version 1.0.8 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

IN-MAL-2026-010772

References

npmjs.com

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks phantomx-tool-client-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring