pfp-integration-mobile-headingnpm

On require() of the package, bootstrap.js selects a platform-specific binary path, downloads an opaque executable over HTTPS from a rotating list of Cloudflare Workers hosts (oob-worker.cf*.workers.dev, assembled from string-split fragments to evade static analysis), and falls back to a DNS-TXT covert channel across tin.dl.well1.site, tina.dl.well1.site, ldr.dl.well1.site, and win.dl.well1.site that reassembles a base64-encoded payload from numbered TXT records. The fetched bytes are written to /var/tmp or %TEMP% under disguised names (.cache<hex>, dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe,.analytics_state), chmod 0755 on POSIX, and spawned detached via /bin/sh -c or cmd.exe /c start. Hostnames are obfuscated with array.join, filenames impersonate dotnet diagnostics and analytics state, and DISABLE_TELEMETRY / DO_NOT_TRACK env vars gate execution as a benign cover story. The package advertises 'device integration' but performs none of that on load; the sole import-time behavior is retrieving and executing an attacker-controlled binary.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.