peter-desktop-peter-big-columnnpm
peter-desktop-peter-big-column is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-12184) that executes malicious code on install (malicious version 20.3.2). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in peter-desktop-peter-big-column (npm)
What this malware does
On require(), index.js loads runtime.js which assembles download hostnames at runtime from split string fragments (resolving to oob-worker.cf99-9b3.workers.dev and *.dl.well1.site) and fetches a platform-specific binary via HTTPS with a DNS TXT fallback channel. The retrieved bytes are written to /tmp or %TEMP% under a disguised name (.cache<hex> on POSIX, dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe on Windows), chmod 0755 is applied on POSIX, and the binary is spawned detached via /bin/sh -c '<path> &' or cmd /c start. A deduplication lockfile is disguised as an analytics stamp. lib/telemetry.js ships a second copy of the same fetch-write-chmod-spawn dropper under an 'apm.node' SDK guise. The delivered binary is attacker-controlled and opaque; string-array hostname assembly hides the destinations from static inspection.
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Malicious packageFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for peter-desktop-peter-big-column (version 20.3.2). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging peter-desktop-peter-big-column across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
Remove peter-desktop-peter-big-column from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.
Did it already run?
If peter-desktop-peter-big-column was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks peter-desktop-peter-big-column before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks peter-desktop-peter-big-column-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.