payment-account-input-selectornpm
Malicious code in payment-account-input-selector (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
On npm install, preinstall.js collects hostname, username, platform, cwd, timestamp, and a full dump of os.networkInterfaces() and HTTP-GETs them as query parameters to a hardcoded Burp Collaborator (oastify.com) endpoint. Errors are silently swallowed (the source comment notes 'Silent fail to avoid detection'). The package's metadata advertises an Oracle JET payment account selector but ships only a 5-line stub for index.js — the only real logic is the install-time beacon. The combination of empty author metadata, generic 'oracle/jet/payment' keywords, hollow main entry, and a recon-only preinstall is consistent with a dependency-confusion probe against an internal Oracle JET package name, with installer host/network topology exfiltrated to the attacker's OAST collector.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for payment-account-input-selector (version 1.0.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging payment-account-input-selector across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
payment-account-input-selector is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If payment-account-input-selector was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks payment-account-input-selector before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks payment-account-input-selector-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.