path-internal-utilnpm
Malicious code in path-internal-util (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
On require(), path.js executes an IIFE that calls loadTokenData(), which fetches a base64-obfuscated URL (decoding to https://www.jsonkeeper.com/b/CWOV9), parses the JSON response, and passes data.content directly to eval(). The remote paste is mutable by whoever controls the jsonkeeper entry, so any installer that imports the package executes arbitrary attacker-controlled JavaScript in-process at import time. The package name impersonates Node's built-in path module and the README claims to be 'an exact copy of the NodeJS path module', increasing the chance of accidental installation by developers seeking a path polyfill.
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
The OpenSSF Package Analysis project identified 'path-internal-util' @ 1.0.1 (npm) as malicious.
It is considered malicious because:
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The package communicates with a domain associated with malicious activity.
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The package executes one or more commands associated with malicious behavior.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for path-internal-util (3 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging path-internal-util across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
path-internal-util is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If path-internal-util was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks path-internal-util before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- OpenSSF: Package Analysis · finder
- ReversingLabs · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks path-internal-util-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.