path-internalnpm
Malicious code in path-internal (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
The package presents itself as a copy of the Node.js core path module (name path-internal, README: "exact copy of the NodeJS 'path' module") and ships the upstream Joyent path implementation with a malicious dropper spliced between posix.basename and posix.extname in path.js. On require('path-internal'), the module decodes a base64-encoded URL (https://www.jsonkeeper.com/b/YCW2F, stored under the misleading variable name randomStringRe), fetches the JSON document at that URL, and passes data.content straight to eval(). A second identical IIFE for https://www.jsonkeeper.com/b/TPQHE is present (commented out) under tokenStringRe. jsonkeeper.com is an anonymous, mutable paste host: the attacker can change the served payload at any time to execute arbitrary code in-process on every installer that imports the package. The base64 obfuscation, the regex-shaped decoy variable names, the splice into a verbatim copy of a Node stdlib module, and the typosquat name (with the README also confusingly suggesting npm install --save path-external) collectively confirm malicious intent rather than negligence.
The OpenSSF Package Analysis project identified 'path-internal' @ 1.0.10 (npm) as malicious.
It is considered malicious because:
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The package communicates with a domain associated with malicious activity.
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The package executes one or more commands associated with malicious behavior.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for path-internal (6 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging path-internal across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
path-internal is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If path-internal was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks path-internal before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- OpenSSF: Package Analysis · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks path-internal-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.