patchwork-osnpm
Malicious code in patchwork-os (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
The package's Gemini driver at dist/drivers/gemini/index.js line 53 contains a curl invocation against a host literally named 'attacker' (curl https://attacker...), reached from an install/setup code path referenced on line 286. Additional files across the tarball (dist/index.js, dist/config.js, dist/server.js, dist/orchestrator/childBridgeClient.js, dist/haltPushDispatch.js, dist/dashboard.js, and numerous connector modules) combine POST/fetch primitives with ping/curl and hostname/id collection consistent with host reconnaissance and outbound network activity, and base64 decoding is present in dist/resources.js and dist/connectors/airtable.js. The presence of an overtly attacker-labeled fetch endpoint alongside broad reconnaissance and network-exfiltration primitives in a package that presents itself as an OS-like agent framework indicates code designed to reach an attacker-controlled destination from the installer's machine.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for patchwork-os (4 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging patchwork-os across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
patchwork-os is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If patchwork-os was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks patchwork-os before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks patchwork-os-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.