parallelynpm
parallely is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-11143) that typosquats a legitimate package to trick installs (malicious version 10.0.3). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in parallely (npm)
What this malware does
parallely impersonates the concurrently package: package.json copies concurrently's author (Kimmo Brunfeldt), repository (open-cli-tools/concurrently), README, and ships bin entries named concurrently and conc. dist/lib/spawn.js injects a dropper into resolveShell() that fires whenever the library's concurrently() API is invoked or its concurrently/conc bin is run. The dropper re-spawns itself detached with an env guard to run once, performs anti-analysis checks (Linux /proc TracerPid, Node --inspect/--debug flags, inspector.url()), reconstructs an AES-256-GCM key by XOR-combining four base64 blobs, decrypts a hidden download URL via createDecipheriv("aes-256-gcm",...).setAuthTag(...), fetches a platform-specific payload, writes it to os.tmpdir()/ins-<euid>/{linux|mac|win.js}, and executes it detached with stdio ignored and windowsHide set. The destination host is not present as a plain string, defeating static extraction.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
TyposquatFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for parallely (version 10.0.3). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging parallely across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
parallely is a typosquat — you almost certainly intended a legitimately-named package. Remove parallely, install the correct package, and rotate any secrets exposed during the install since post-install scripts may have already run.
Did it already run?
If parallely was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks parallely before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks parallely-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.