page-info-servicenpm
Malicious code in page-info-service (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
[email protected] ships an empty stub (index.js is module.exports = {}) with placeholder author/description metadata and an unusually high 99.9.1 version designed to win semver resolution against an internal package name. Its sole effect is a dependencies entry that pulls ltidisafe from an external HTTPS tarball at https://ltidi.storage.googleapis.com/depenconf/ltidisafe-2.9.3.tgz — not from the npm registry. On npm install, npm fetches and installs that tarball and runs whatever lifecycle scripts and code it contains. The tarball is hosted on a third-party Google Cloud Storage bucket under a path (depenconf/) that explicitly suggests dependency-confusion tooling; its contents are mutable by the bucket owner, there is no integrity hash, no version pinning to a trusted registry, and no relation to any stated package purpose. This matches the canonical dependency-confusion off-registry-dropper pattern.
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
The OpenSSF Package Analysis project identified 'page-info-service' @ 99.9.1 (npm) as malicious.
It is considered malicious because:
- The package communicates with a domain associated with malicious activity.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Malicious packageFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for page-info-service (version 99.9.1). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging page-info-service across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
Remove page-info-service from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.
Did it already run?
If page-info-service was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks page-info-service before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- OpenSSF: Package Analysis · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks page-info-service-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.