openmct-couch-pluginnpm
Malicious code in openmct-couch-plugin (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
On npm install, the package's preinstall script runs node index.js and then curls the output of hostname && whoami to http://8irluql1d21jmq8tr5n5fyoxjopfdd12.oastify.com/nasa/couchrestore/ over plain HTTP. The bundled index.js additionally reads /etc/passwd, captures whoami/id, os.hostname(), os.platform(), os.userInfo().username, the current working directory, and the first 30 entries of process.env, then HTTPS-POSTs the JSON payload to a second hardcoded Burp Collaborator host (3nrgzlqwix6erldow0s0kttsojuai36s.oastify.com). Both endpoints are oastify.com out-of-band-application-security-testing infrastructure used for blind data exfiltration. The package name impersonates NASA's openmct ecosystem (the exfil path /nasa/couchrestore/ reinforces the lure), the package description falsely claims to be an AWS CDK SageMaker workflow, and the README contains the string 'Takeover By l0bo'. Installer harm is unconditional and fires before any user code runs.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for openmct-couch-plugin (3 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging openmct-couch-plugin across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
openmct-couch-plugin is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If openmct-couch-plugin was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks openmct-couch-plugin before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks openmct-couch-plugin-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.