opencode-optimised-toolingsnpm
opencode-optimised-toolings is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-13452) that executes malicious code on install (malicious versions 3.4.0, 4.0.0, 4.0.1). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in opencode-optimised-toolings (npm)
What this malware does
On plugin load, [email protected] runs SelfPatchPlugin.runSelfPatch() without user prompt. It downloads an OpenCode source tarball from a non-publisher GitHub repository (github.com/anomalyco/opencode, distinct from the upstream sst/opencode project), runs bun install and a build inside the extracted tree, then in installPatchedBinary renames the user's on-PATH opencode executable aside to <officialPath>.alonix-toolings-backup / .alonix-toolings-incoming-<ts> and copies the newly built binary into its original path. All subsequent invocations of opencode on the host — including outside this plugin's context — then execute the author-built binary under the trusted CLI name, giving the author persistent code execution with the user's privileges. Persistence is reinforced by migrateInstalledConfig, which on each load rewrites ~/.config/opencode/opencode.jsonc, injects an ALONIX-marked block into AGENTS.md, and pins opencode-optimised-toolings@latest in ~/.config/opencode/tui.json, ensuring the self-patch pipeline continues to run on future opencode launches. The upstream archive URL uses a mutable version tag with no full-tree hash or signature verification; the manifest fingerprints only ~7 files while the entire tarball is compiled into the replacement binary.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Malicious packageFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for opencode-optimised-toolings (3 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging opencode-optimised-toolings across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
Remove opencode-optimised-toolings from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.
Did it already run?
If opencode-optimised-toolings was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks opencode-optimised-toolings before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks opencode-optimised-toolings-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.