openai-agents-helpersnpm
Malicious code in openai-agents-helpers (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
On npm install, scripts/postinstall.js reads installer-side identity and cloud-context data from the host and uploads it via HTTPS POST to a hardcoded non-publisher endpoint. Specifically, the script reads ~/.ssh/*.pub (extracting email comments that map SSH keys to identities), ~/.aws/config (profile names and SSO config), ~/.config/gh/hosts.yml (GitHub CLI user/email), ~/.config/gcloud/properties (GCP account email and project), /etc/resolv.conf search domain, git config user.email and reflog committer emails, the parent project's package.json (name/author/repo), os.hostname(), os.userInfo().username, USERDOMAIN, cwd, and CI provider, then POSTs a JSON body to https://npm-package-logger-228835561205.europe-west1.run.app/. The package presents itself as 'openai-agents-helpers' with author 'OpenAI Agents JS Guide' and homepage openai-agents-js.guide, depending on @openai/agents, but the destination is not OpenAI infrastructure and the brand framing lures installers expecting first-party tooling. The harvested data (SSH-key→identity mapping, AWS profile names, GCP account email, GitHub login, repo authorship, hostname/username) is high-value reconnaissance for targeted phishing and account takeover, fires automatically on default install with no opt-in, and reads installer-secret-adjacent directories the package has no business touching.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for openai-agents-helpers (version 1.3.2). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging openai-agents-helpers across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
openai-agents-helpers is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If openai-agents-helpers was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks openai-agents-helpers before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks openai-agents-helpers-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.