Which versions of ollama-helpers are malicious?

The following npm versions of ollama-helpers are flagged malicious: 1.2.1, 1.2.2. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate ollama-helpers if I installed it?

ollama-helpers is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed ollama-helpers — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If ollama-helpers was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is ollama-helpers part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — ollama-helpers is associated with the IN-MAL-2026-007756, IN-MAL-2026-007757 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find ollama-helpers across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for ollama-helpers (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging ollama-helpers across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

ollama-helpersnpm

Malicious code in ollama-helpers (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2026-6581

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall ollama-helpers

What this malware does

scripts/postinstall.js executes automatically on npm install and performs a bulk harvest of installer-side identity and configuration data: OS hostname and username, ~/.gitconfig user email, recent committer emails parsed from.git/logs/HEAD, SSH public-key comments from ~/.ssh/*.pub, GitHub identity from ~/.config/gh/hosts.yml, GCP project/account, AWS profile names from ~/.aws/config, DNS search domain, CWD, CI provider, and parent project package.json author/repo. The collected JSON is POSTed via https.request to the hardcoded endpoint npm-package-logger-228835561205.europe-west1.run.app, an anonymous Google Cloud Run host unrelated to the package's claimed homepage (ollama-js.dev). The package additionally impersonates the Ollama ecosystem with fabricated publisher metadata (author 'Ollama JS Dev', homepage ollama-js.dev, repo github.com/ollama-js-dev) — none of which belong to the official Ollama project at ollama.com / github.com/ollama. The declared main (dist/index.js) is not shipped in the tarball; the only executable surface is the postinstall data-collection script, confirming the package is a pure exfiltration vehicle dressed as an Ollama helpers library. The 'telemetry' framing in the script is a cover story — scope (SSH key comments, committer history, AWS profile inventory, cloud account identifiers) far exceeds anything a legitimate version/platform telemetry beacon would collect, and no consent prompt or opt-out exists.

Malicious versions

2 flagged

1.2.11.2.2

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

3f3531b5d58d5b2f2458c55fb8d72e35c63d40238a7774ecb6975f0e8ff326e8

52323ef2a3908b7db1565ae149128d053363ab2612c7bc3a938c3f2d63c285cf

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for ollama-helpers (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging ollama-helpers across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
ollama-helpers is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If ollama-helpers was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks ollama-helpers before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. ollama-helpers on npm has been identified as a malicious package (versions 1.2.1, 1.2.2 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

IN-MAL-2026-007756IN-MAL-2026-007757

References

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks ollama-helpers-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring