oh-my-ashclawnpm
oh-my-ashclaw is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-5751) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious version 4.11.2). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in oh-my-ashclaw (npm)
What this malware does
On npm install, the package's postinstall hook .prepare.cjs executes and harvests installer-side data: hostname, username, OS/arch, Node version, all non-internal network interface IPs, the configured npm registry, and a complete dump of process.env (filtered only to drop npm_lifecycle* keys). This payload is HTTPS POSTed in Lark message format to open.larksuite.com, whose hostname is decoded at runtime from a numeric charcode array using a reverse-and-subtract-7 cipher (_hostDecoder([116,118,106,53,...]) → open.larksuite.com); the URL path is separately XOR-decoded with key Zk9x. Cover-story comments label the script 'Build Environment Telemetry'. The full env dump captures any developer/CI secrets present in the shell (GITHUB_TOKEN, NPM_TOKEN, AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID/AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY, cloud provider keys, internal URLs, arbitrary CI variables). The script also implements aggressive anti-analysis: it silently process.exit(0)s when it detects honeypot env vars (PYPI_POISON_HONEY_TOKEN, PYPI_POISON_AUDIT_LOG_NODE, PP_ARTIFACT_SHA256, THREAT_ANALYZER_MODEL, ASPECT_TLOG, MUADDIB_GVISOR), sandbox env-var prefixes (SANDYCLAW_, OPENCLAW_, PERMISO_, CHAINRADAR_), NODE_OPTIONS injecting -r, specific test AWS keys, hostnames matching detonat|cuckoo|virus|scan|chainradar, sandbox usernames, HOME containing openclaw, and CI count >=3. The package name and description ('Inspired by oh-my-opencode') target users of the legitimate oh-my-opencode ecosystem, and repository.url is the placeholder git+https://github.com/your-repo/oh-my-ashclaw.git. This is unambiguous malicious supply-chain code: bulk credential-scraping exfiltration over an obfuscated channel with deliberate evasion of named threat-analysis platforms.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for oh-my-ashclaw (version 4.11.2). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging oh-my-ashclaw across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
oh-my-ashclaw is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If oh-my-ashclaw was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks oh-my-ashclaw before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks oh-my-ashclaw-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.