noxleyssnpm
Advisory published Updated
noxleyss is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-17402) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious versions 1.0.0, 1.1.0, 1.1.1…). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in noxleyss (npm)
What this malware does
This package is part of a large family (100+ identified as of September 2026) of near-identical
forks of the Baileys WhatsApp Web library that inject a covert channel-subscription action into
the WhatsApp socket layer. On connect, the injected code issues an authenticated w:mex FOLLOW
query (query_id 7871414976211147) against one or more attacker-chosen WhatsApp Channel/Newsletter
JIDs, using the installer's own authenticated WhatsApp session -- silently subscribing the
victim's account to channels it never asked to join.
The target JID(s) are hidden from casual source review via one of several obfuscation techniques observed across the family: a plain string literal, base64 encoding, base64+XOR, or a char-code array reconstructed at runtime. Some variants instead fetch a mutable, attacker-controlled remote JSON/JS list of target JIDs from GitHub or another host at runtime, letting the target list change after installation without a new npm publish. Every sample in the family shares the same underlying mechanism (a wrapped/patched socket-connect routine that fires the FOLLOW query some seconds after connect), even though the package name, JID value(s), and obfuscation/delivery method differ per fork.
The malicious action abuses the installer's own authenticated WhatsApp session to gain reach and subscribers for attacker-controlled channels; it does not exfiltrate credentials, establish persistence, or execute arbitrary remote code.
Affected package: noxleyss (npm), version(s): 1.1.11, 1.1.8, 1.1.7, 1.1.6, 1.1.5, 1.1.4, 1.1.3, 1.1.2, 1.1.1, 1.1.0, 1.0.0.
noxleyss is a Baileys-family WhatsApp library fork that, on every successful WhatsApp connection ('connection.update' == 'open'), silently uses the connected user's WhatsApp identity to follow and mute newsletter channels chosen by the package author. Two mechanisms are present. First, two hardcoded newsletter JIDs (120363428355171197@newsletter and 120363428984357510@newsletter) and the method names 'newsletterFollow'/'newsletterMute' are concealed as String.fromCharCode numeric arrays and reconstructed at runtime, then invoked on the installer's socket. Second, in makeNewsletterSocket an 'autoJoinChannels' handler is wired to the connection-open event with a 30-second delay; it fetches https://raw.githubusercontent.com/noxXza/data/refs/heads/main/noxleys.json (mutable main branch, no pin, no integrity check), filters the response to @newsletter JIDs, and for each one calls newsletterWMexQuery(id, FOLLOW) followed by MUTE. The remote list is author-mutable, so the set of newsletters the installer's account is forced to subscribe to can be changed at any time after install. None of this is documented in the README. There is no credential theft, environment or filesystem scraping, remote code execution, or persistence; the fetched content is a JID list consumed as data, not executed. The covert action uses the installer's WhatsApp identity for subscriber inflation on channels the author controls, and the charcode obfuscation of JIDs and method names is a deliberate evasion of static review.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Search your lockfiles and build artifacts for noxleyss (12 malicious versions).
If you installed it — respond
noxleyss is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If noxleyss was installed, its post-install payload may already have run. Removing the package does not undo that — check outbound connections and credential use from the install window onward.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- OX Security · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks noxleyss-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.