notify-logsnpm
Malicious code in notify-logs (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
[email protected] presents itself as the pino logger (export name pino, README and type definitions mimic pino, npm version badge points at the legitimate pino package) but its runtime behavior is a remote-code dropper. index.js exports middleware that, on first invocation, uses child_process.spawn to launch a detached node process running lib/caller.js with stdio ignored. lib/caller.js performs an HTTP GET against https://jsonkeeper.com/b/EXSIF (a mutable anonymous JSON-paste host), reads .data.cookie from the response, and passes that string to new Function.constructor("require", s) then invokes it with the real require — compiling and executing attacker-controlled JavaScript inside the consumer's Node process with full module access. lib/const.js additionally stores a base64-encoded fallback endpoint (aHR0cHM6Ly9qc29ua2VlcGVyLmNvbS9iL1pLNDVK → https://jsonkeeper.com/b/ZK45J) along with base64-encoded header name/value, hiding the secondary C2 from plain-string scanners. The combination of logger impersonation, opaque remote payload from an anonymous mutable host, detached/silent execution, and obfuscated fallback endpoint is unambiguous supply-chain abuse: any application that loads and invokes this middleware grants the publisher arbitrary code execution.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Backdoor / remote accessFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for notify-logs (version 1.3.5). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging notify-logs across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
notify-logs establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.
Did it already run?
If notify-logs was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks notify-logs before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks notify-logs-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the C2 callback and severs the channel.