nonenull1npm
Malicious code in nonenull1 (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
On npm install, [email protected] auto-executes a credential stealer via node-gyp. package.json sets gypfile: true, and the shipped binding.gyp declares no native sources but places a GYP command-expansion <!(node index.js...) in the sources array, so node-gyp rebuild runs index.js during the configure step (an implicit install hook that is not declared as scripts.postinstall). index.js then: (1) collects host fingerprint (os.hostname, os.userInfo, process.platform, cwd, node version, git user.email) and POSTs it to https://crabbing-thong-overhung.ngrok-free.dev/ping; (2) reads every file in ~/.ssh, ~/.aws, ~/.config, ~/.kube, ~/.docker, and ~/.gnupg, plus every.env* file discovered walking 8 directory levels up from cwd, and POSTs the contents to /exfil at the same host; (3) filters process.env for keys matching token|secret|key|pass|pwd|auth|api|cred|jwt|cookie and exfiltrates those values. The destination is a hardcoded ngrok tunnel controlled by the publisher. This is a textbook installer-side credential stealer with an implicit install hook designed to evade manifest-only scanners.
The OpenSSF Package Analysis project identified 'nonenull1' @ 1.5.2 (npm) as malicious.
It is considered malicious because:
- The package communicates with a domain associated with malicious activity.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for nonenull1 (6 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging nonenull1 across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
nonenull1 is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If nonenull1 was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks nonenull1 before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- OpenSSF: Package Analysis · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks nonenull1-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.