nodemon-patchnpm
nodemon-patch is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-10110) that typosquats a legitimate package to trick installs (malicious versions 3.1.15, 3.1.16). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in nodemon-patch (npm)
What this malware does
The package is named nodemon-patch but its package.json metadata (homepage https://nodemon.io, author Remy Sharp / github.com/remy, repository, funding) and lib/ source are copied verbatim from the legitimate nodemon package by Remy Sharp. The package author has not published nodemon and the name is a single-suffix variant of a top-100 npm package, consistent with namespace impersonation. The local lib/ code mirrors upstream nodemon and is functionally benign on its own, but package.json declares a runtime dependency on webpack-patch@^1.1.7 — a similarly-shaped *-patch name that is not a dependency of real nodemon and does not correspond to any established OSS library — plus chai as a runtime (not dev) dependency. Any developer who runs npm i nodemon-patch expecting nodemon will silently pull webpack-patch into their dependency tree, where its install/require-time code would execute. The combination of cloned identity metadata + a same-suffix sibling dependency with no legitimate provenance is the namespace-abuse / dropper-lure shape, but confirming installer harm requires inspecting webpack-patch itself.
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
TyposquatFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for nodemon-patch (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging nodemon-patch across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
nodemon-patch is a typosquat — you almost certainly intended a legitimately-named package. Remove nodemon-patch, install the correct package, and rotate any secrets exposed during the install since post-install scripts may have already run.
Did it already run?
If nodemon-patch was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks nodemon-patch before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks nodemon-patch-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.