nodealphanpm
nodealpha is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-14270) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious version 1.0.7). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in nodealpha (npm)
What this malware does
The package installs a global keyboard hook (keyboard.add_hotkey on ctrl+c), polls the system clipboard every 300ms via pyperclip.paste(), and captures full-screen screenshots via ImageGrab.grab(). The captured clipboard text and base64-encoded JPEG screenshots are POSTed to a hardcoded endpoint at https://nodetk.vercel.app/api (API_URL constant, session.post(API_URL, json={'image': img_data,...})). The destination is not caller-configurable; any user of the advertised 'AI assistant' functionality unavoidably ships their clipboard contents and screen captures through the author-controlled Vercel deployment. Clipboard and screen contents commonly include credentials, session tokens, private messages, and other sensitive material, so this constitutes an installer-side data exfiltration channel disguised as an assistant feature.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for nodealpha (version 1.0.7). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging nodealpha across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
nodealpha is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If nodealpha was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks nodealpha before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks nodealpha-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.