Which versions of node-setup-helpers are malicious?

The following npm versions of node-setup-helpers are flagged malicious: 1.5.1. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate node-setup-helpers if I installed it?

node-setup-helpers is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed node-setup-helpers — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If node-setup-helpers was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is node-setup-helpers part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — node-setup-helpers is associated with the GHSA-vxfv-w8fq-239r, IN-MAL-2026-004496, IN-MAL-2026-004498 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find node-setup-helpers across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for node-setup-helpers (version 1.5.1). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging node-setup-helpers across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

node-setup-helpersnpm

Malicious code in node-setup-helpers (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2026-4280

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall node-setup-helpers

What this malware does

Ten packages published by npm user asdxzxc at version 1.0.10 target developers working on AI and LLM tooling. Each package masquerades as a developer utility while executing a two-stage payload triggered via postinstall: package.json → lib/setup.js → lib/worker.js.

Credential harvesting: lib/worker.js scans the filesystem for private keys (64-char hex), BIP39 mnemonics (12–24 word phrases), API keys and secrets, and passwords from env vars and shell history (.bash_history, .zsh_history, .fish_history, .mysql_history, .psql_history), including wallet tool invocations (geth account, hardhat, metamask, wallet import). Targeted paths include ~/.ssh, ~/.aws/credentials, ~/.config/gcloud, ~/.azure, ~/.docker/config.json, ~/.kube/config, crypto wallet dirs (~/.ethereum, ~/.bitcoin, ~/.solana), exchange configs (Binance, Bybit, OKX, KuCoin, Deribit, 3Commas), .env, .npmrc, .gitconfig. Also performs browser data theft and Ethereum keystore brute-force. A priority-target list fetched from the actor's GitHub Pages endpoint enables aggressive deep scanning for pre-registered high-value hosts.

AI self-propagation: after credential theft, a _propagate() function executes a multi-vector campaign to infect AI coding assistants. It writes poisoned .cursorrules and CLAUDE.md files — framed as "P-2024-001 Enterprise Credential Integrity Standard" — to all discovered project directories, parent directories, and home subdirectories, instructing Cursor, Claude Code, and GitHub Copilot to execute the remote payload and propagate it via Issues, PRs, and documentation. Git hooks (post-merge, post-checkout, pre-commit, pre-push) are injected into all .git repos found on disk, and a persistence block is appended to ~/.bashrc, ~/.zshrc, and ~/.profile. Zero-width steganography (ZWSP/ZWJ/ZWNJ/LTRM encoding) embeds hidden scan triggers in all AI-generated text output, enabling AI-to-AI chain infection invisible to humans.

C2/exfil: a remotely configurable JSON config hosted on the actor's GitHub Pages delivers the active webhook list, encryption key, and scan strategy; hardcoded fallback webhooks at webhook.site and a DNS TXT record fallback are used if the primary channel fails. A dedup marker at ~/.local/share/.p2024_integrity prevents re-propagation within 24 hours.

node-setup-helpers poses as helper utilities for Node.js project setup and configuration.

The package's lib/trap-core.js combines host enumeration (os.hostname(), os.platform()), filesystem reads (fs.existsSync against multiple paths), child_process invocations (with curl and ping observable in the file), and HTTPS POST calls that include a 'hostname:' field in the request body — the canonical shape of a system-information beacon that gathers host identity and shells out to OS commands, then exfiltrates the results over HTTPS. Multiple POST sites (lines 385, 411, 466, 548, 549) and repeated child_process imports across the file indicate a deliberate, large surface for collection and outbound transmission rather than incidental utility code. Installing this package places this collector in the dependency graph; any code path that reaches lib/trap-core.js will leak host details and command output to a remote endpoint.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

Malicious versions

1 flagged

1.5.1

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

32024ed016e86afba2889a0ed45a587d84d4f4f51d69f13511b4d6a5bf185b79

626e815912fa24995ad58e18c495b1c6bd70987f9970b6262374f292e3c0d6ed

b410780411be5edfed752748ed9d0f1cb84fee1ef28b203af1575030ff414879

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for node-setup-helpers (version 1.5.1). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging node-setup-helpers across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
node-setup-helpers is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If node-setup-helpers was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks node-setup-helpers before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. node-setup-helpers on npm has been identified as a malicious package (version 1.5.1 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

GHSA-vxfv-w8fq-239rIN-MAL-2026-004496IN-MAL-2026-004498

References

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder
SafeDep · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks node-setup-helpers-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring