Which versions of node-pino are malicious?

The following npm versions of node-pino are flagged malicious: 2.3.2. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate node-pino if I installed it?

node-pino is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed node-pino — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If node-pino was installed, its post-install payload may already have run. Removing the package does not undo that — check outbound connections and credential use from the install window onward.

Is node-pino part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — node-pino is associated with the GHSA-w294-7cjj-7mvg campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find node-pino across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Search your lockfiles and build artifacts for node-pino (version 2.3.2).

Malicious package

node-pinonpm

Advisory published Jul 1, 2026Updated Aug 27, 2026

node-pino is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-6762) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious version 2.3.2). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

Malicious code in node-pino (npm)

MAL-2026-6762

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall node-pino

What this malware does

node-pino is a one-edit typosquat of the popular pino logger that ships repackaged winston plus a malicious postinstall dropper. On npm install, the postinstall hook (npm run license -> node lib/winston/license) spawns a DETACHED, unref'd child process that reads an AES-256-CBC-encrypted blob (license.list, ~211 KB), decrypts it with a hardcoded key/iv, and eval()s the ~105 KB obfuscated infostealer payload. The stealer targets crypto wallets (exodus.wallet), the macOS Keychain, and Brave/Chrome/Edge user-data, zips the loot to p5.zip, and exfiltrates via HTTP POST /upload to a hardcoded C2 (port :1224). Structure, the :1224 C2 port, and targeting are CONSISTENT WITH the DPRK 'Contagious Interview' / BeaverTail npm campaign (stated as consistent-with, not a definitive actor attribution). First published 2025-09-16 (single version), it remained live and installable for ~278 days on no advisory list until pkgproof flagged it via semantic name<->content coherence analysis. Indicators of compromise: postinstall -> npm run license -> node lib/winston/license; detached, unref'd child that outlives npm install; AES-256-CBC-encrypted license.list (~211 KB) with a hardcoded key/iv in parse.js; eval() of the ~105 KB decrypted obfuscated payload; C2 on port :1224; exfiltration via zip to p5.zip and HTTP POST /upload; targets exodus.wallet, the macOS Keychain, and Brave/Chrome/Edge user-data. All IOCs were extracted by STATIC/OFFLINE analysis (offline decryption of the bundled blob); the attacker payload was never executed, so no live C2 callback or runtime artifact was generated by this analysis. The decryption key, the deobfuscated payload, and the exact C2 host are deliberately omitted; no specific IP is asserted.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

Malicious versions

1 flagged

2.3.2

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

c931f155b77679c54a55fcfcab733826373baaf86922de6fed9adeb9dd6b0705

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Search your lockfiles and build artifacts for node-pino (version 2.3.2).
If you installed it — respond
node-pino is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If node-pino was installed, its post-install payload may already have run. Removing the package does not undo that — check outbound connections and credential use from the install window onward.

Frequently asked questions

No. node-pino on npm has been identified as a malicious package (version 2.3.2 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

GHSA-w294-7cjj-7mvg

References

Credits

pkgproof (https://pkgproof.dev) · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks node-pino-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring

Explore

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