node-pinonpm
Malicious code in node-pino (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
node-pino is a one-edit typosquat of the popular pino logger that ships repackaged winston plus a malicious postinstall dropper. On npm install, the postinstall hook (npm run license -> node lib/winston/license) spawns a DETACHED, unref'd child process that reads an AES-256-CBC-encrypted blob (license.list, ~211 KB), decrypts it with a hardcoded key/iv, and eval()s the ~105 KB obfuscated infostealer payload. The stealer targets crypto wallets (exodus.wallet), the macOS Keychain, and Brave/Chrome/Edge user-data, zips the loot to p5.zip, and exfiltrates via HTTP POST /upload to a hardcoded C2 (port :1224). Structure, the :1224 C2 port, and targeting are CONSISTENT WITH the DPRK 'Contagious Interview' / BeaverTail npm campaign (stated as consistent-with, not a definitive actor attribution). First published 2025-09-16 (single version), it remained live and installable for ~278 days on no advisory list until pkgproof flagged it via semantic name<->content coherence analysis. Indicators of compromise: postinstall -> npm run license -> node lib/winston/license; detached, unref'd child that outlives npm install; AES-256-CBC-encrypted license.list (~211 KB) with a hardcoded key/iv in parse.js; eval() of the ~105 KB decrypted obfuscated payload; C2 on port :1224; exfiltration via zip to p5.zip and HTTP POST /upload; targets exodus.wallet, the macOS Keychain, and Brave/Chrome/Edge user-data. All IOCs were extracted by STATIC/OFFLINE analysis (offline decryption of the bundled blob); the attacker payload was never executed, so no live C2 callback or runtime artifact was generated by this analysis. The decryption key, the deobfuscated payload, and the exact C2 host are deliberately omitted; no specific IP is asserted.
Malicious versions
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for node-pino (version 2.3.2). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging node-pino across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
node-pino is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If node-pino was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks node-pino before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
References
Credits
- pkgproof (https://pkgproof.dev) · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks node-pino-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.