node-path-addonnpm
Malicious code in node-path-addon (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
node-path-addon presents itself as an extension of the Node.js built-in 'path' module. Its main entry (path.js) delegates by executing require('path-addon-extend') at module load, and package.json declares that dependency at wildcard version '*', so importing node-path-addon unconditionally resolves and executes the latest published version of path-addon-extend — whose contents are controlled by whoever owns that separate npm name. The shim also imports the 'https' module without using it, and the README instructs users to run 'npm install --save path-addon' rather than the actual published name 'node-path-addon', a naming mismatch consistent with typosquat lure behavior. The package itself contains no direct exfiltration or shell execution, but the wildcard-pinned require on import is a loader that grants an external, mutable dependency arbitrary code execution in the consumer's process on every install and require.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for node-path-addon (version 1.0.8). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging node-path-addon across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
node-path-addon is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If node-path-addon was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks node-path-addon before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks node-path-addon-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.