netspeedutilnpm
Malicious code in netspeedutil (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
On install, setup.js walks up to the installer's project tree and scans image files for a 'STEG' marker. When found, it AES-256-CBC-decrypts an embedded steganographic payload that points to a file inside the installer's node_modules and uses a regex (cli.command("build [root]"...finally{...}) to patch that third-party CLI's build command, prepending an import of netspeedutil/inject.js and an await inject() call inside the build's finally block. Once tampered, every subsequent project build runs inject.js, which uses javascript-obfuscator (control-flow flattening, dead-code injection, base64 string-array encoding) to embed an obfuscated client into dist/index.html. That client opens a WebRTC TURN connection to a hardcoded attacker host at 13.234.111.178:3478 as a covert C2 / signaling channel and renders attacker-supplied DOM content to end users of any site the developer ships. The package's stated purpose ('Fast string matching and pattern validation utilities') is a cover story unrelated to the actual code. This is a build-pipeline supply-chain compromise: the installer's production artifacts are silently weaponized against their own end users.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Backdoor / remote accessFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for netspeedutil (version 1.0.13). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging netspeedutil across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
netspeedutil establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.
Did it already run?
If netspeedutil was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks netspeedutil before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks netspeedutil-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the C2 callback and severs the channel.