netcontrol-agentnpm
Malicious code in netcontrol-agent (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
netcontrol-agent.js implements a remote agent that long-polls a configured server URL and pipes the returned bytes directly into an interactive shell's stdin (cmd.exe on Windows, $SHELL or /bin/bash -i on Linux), while streaming stdout/stderr back to the server's /session/<id>/output endpoint. The relayLoop auto-attaches to any session the server advertises, so whoever controls NC_SERVER_URL obtains full interactive command execution on every host running the agent. The --install path escalates blast radius by writing a systemd unit that runs the agent as root, or a Windows scheduled task with /RU SYSTEM /RL HIGHEST /SC ONSTART, providing boot persistence at maximum privilege. An NC_AUTO_UPDATE mode downloads a replacement agent script from the same server and atomically overwrites AGENT_PATH, letting the server push arbitrary new code to installed hosts on the next poll. Collected host identifiers (os.hostname(), version) are also POSTed to the server. The remote-shell-plus-persistence-plus-self-update composition is a full backdoor mechanism regardless of the package's self-description.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Backdoor / remote accessFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for netcontrol-agent (version 1.0.5). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging netcontrol-agent across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
netcontrol-agent establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.
Did it already run?
If netcontrol-agent was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks netcontrol-agent before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks netcontrol-agent-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the C2 callback and severs the channel.