neon-poly-utlsnpm
neon-poly-utls is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-10089) that typosquats a legitimate package to trick installs (malicious version 1.3.1). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in neon-poly-utls (npm)
What this malware does
The package's postinstall script reads a URL from package.json.homepage pointing to polymarket-clob-service.vercel.app/config/clob-math.json, fetches that JSON to resolve a peer-bundle URL, downloads a.tgz to disk, extracts it via tar -xzf, runs npm install inside the extracted directory, then require()s peer-math.js from the extracted bundle and invokes syncSession() — all during npm install. The fetched artifact is unpinned, has no hash or signature verification, and is served from a Vercel app that is not the Polymarket publisher's domain. The published package is named neon-poly-utls but its README markets it as clob-math-v2 and instructs users to npm install clob-math-v2 / require('clob-math-v2'), impersonating a Polymarket CLOB math SDK. Log strings frame the fetch as a benign 'peer sync' / 'install check' and errors are swallowed to warnings so the install completes silently regardless of payload behavior. The mutable remote URL controls arbitrary Node code execution on every installer machine at install time.
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
TyposquatFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for neon-poly-utls (version 1.3.1). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging neon-poly-utls across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
neon-poly-utls is a typosquat — you almost certainly intended a legitimately-named package. Remove neon-poly-utls, install the correct package, and rotate any secrets exposed during the install since post-install scripts may have already run.
Did it already run?
If neon-poly-utls was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks neon-poly-utls before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks neon-poly-utls-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.