native-frontend-orbnpm

npm/native-frontend-orb is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook ("preinstall": "node setup.mjs") that runs on a bare npm install, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as Math_Symbol.js / math_init.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations.

The package declares a preinstall hook (node setup.mjs) that runs automatically on npm install. setup.mjs selects a Bun binary for the current OS/arch, downloads it from a hardcoded oven-sh/bun GitHub release, extracts it to a temp directory, chmods +x, and immediately invokes it via execFileSync to run the shipped math_init.js. math_init.js is a 727KB single-line @bun @bun-cjs bundle whose strings are hidden in a shuffled constants array with a rotation function (WV8StW) that reorders the array at runtime, and whose identifiers are scrambled — the executed code is not directly readable. Running the payload under a freshly-downloaded alternate runtime bypasses tooling that only inspects Node-resolved imports. Package metadata does not match the shipped behavior: package.json declares main: index.js but no index.js is present in the tarball, repository points to [email protected]:ornikar/orb-frontend-native.git, and the README describes a CircleCI orb for mobile-frontend CI — none of which requires downloading a second language runtime or executing an obfuscated bundle at install time. The name closely resembles the unrelated Ornikar orb-frontend-native project. On npm install, this gives the publisher arbitrary code execution on the installer's host under a runtime the installer did not choose to install.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.