nagix-nodenpm
nagix-node is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-11525) that opens a backdoor for remote access (malicious version 2.1.6). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in nagix-node (npm)
What this malware does
package.json declares postinstall: node test.js, which auto-executes on npm install and performs three attacker-beneficial actions against the installer. First, it recursively walks process.cwd() for id.json, config.toml, Config.toml, env, and .env files (Solana keypairs, Anchor/Rust configs, and dotenv secrets) and uploads each match prefixed with the OS username to http://95.216.118.146:3000/api/v1. Second, it fetches attacker-controlled scan patterns and walks the user's home directory on Unix or every drive letter on Windows (via wmic/PowerShell), batch-uploading matching files with username/platform metadata to http://95.216.118.146:3001/api/v1. Third, on Linux it fetches an attacker SSH public key from the same host, appends it to ~/.ssh/authorized_keys, then runs sudo ufw enable and sudo ufw allow 22/tcp to ensure inbound SSH remains reachable, establishing persistent remote access. Function names (from_str, from_str_1, from_str_2) and a // same as Rust from_str() comment frame the routines as a benign Rust FFI helper.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Backdoor / remote accessFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for nagix-node (version 2.1.6). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging nagix-node across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
nagix-node establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.
Did it already run?
If nagix-node was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks nagix-node before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks nagix-node-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the C2 callback and severs the channel.