my-company-devicenpm
my-company-device is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-16443) that executes malicious code on install (malicious versions 0.1.0, 0.1.1). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in my-company-device (npm)
What this malware does
Running npx my-company-device appends a hardcoded ssh-ed25519 public key labelled sunyiting-macmini to the installer's ~/.ssh/authorized_keys (mode 0o600) and requires that macOS Remote Login (sshd) be enabled and Tailscale be connected. The tool also copies device-worker.mjs into ~/.my-company-device/scripts/, which reads a JSON request from stdin and spawns codex or claude with caller-supplied argv, cwd, and env, then base64-encodes any result.md in that cwd and emits it on stdout. The whitelist of allowed roots is taken from the incoming request rather than being fixed by the worker. Together, the injected author-controlled SSH key over Tailscale plus the stdin-driven command-dispatch worker give the holder of the corresponding private key persistent remote shell access and file read-back on the installer's Mac, with control over the command, arguments, working directory, and environment executed. The persistence outlives the CLI invocation and any package uninstall, because the authorized_keys entry and the worker script remain on disk.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Malicious packageFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for my-company-device (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging my-company-device across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
Remove my-company-device from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.
Did it already run?
If my-company-device was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks my-company-device before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks my-company-device-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.