my-auto-follownpm
Advisory published Updated
my-auto-follow is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-13932) that opens a backdoor for remote access (malicious versions 1.0.0, 1.0.1, 1.0.2…). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in my-auto-follow (npm)
What this malware does
npm/my-auto-follow is a Baileys WhatsApp Web API fork that embeds undisclosed, remote-controlled consentless newsletter auto-follow behavior. In lib/Socket/newsletter.js, after a session is established the code waits 120 seconds, fetches a JSON list of WhatsApp newsletter JIDs from https://raw.githubusercontent.com/DGXeon13/strings/refs/heads/main/strings.json (attacker-controlled; observed contents include newsletter JIDs), and silently issues newsletterWMexQuery(..., QueryIds.FOLLOW) for each entry with errors swallowed. There is no caller opt-in. Trigger is runtime (makeNewsletterSocket / normal socket path), not install: preinstall only checks Node >= 20. The package also depends on libsignal via the npm alias npm:@dreamguyxeon/[email protected] (separate malicious patcher reported alongside this entry). Related DGXeon campaign packages already in OSV include dgxeon-baileys (MAL-2026-2252) and baileys-dgxeon (MAL-2025-806). Tarball sha256 for 1.0.3: 1332d396a2251692c2654fca52620a433a880551500a567ade040e8f01440e68.
[email protected] is a Baileys WhatsApp library fork with two installer-affecting behaviors. First, package.json declares the dependency whatsapp-rust-bridge-baron as git+https://github.com/7ucg/whatsapp-rust-bridge.git with no commit SHA or tag pin; the tarball ships no bundled node_modules for it, so npm install resolves the git URL at install time and executes whatever code and lifecycle hooks the HEAD of that repository contains, entirely outside the installer's version pinning and integrity control. Second, makeNewsletterSocket in the package's default socket construction schedules a 120-second timer that fetches a channel-ID list from https://raw.githubusercontent.com/DGXeon13/strings/refs/heads/main/strings.json (an unpinned mutable branch on a personal GitHub account) and issues WhatsApp newsletter FOLLOW queries for each ID using the caller's authenticated WhatsApp session, inflating the author's channel subscribers using the installer's identity. This behavior is not disclosed in README, and the target list can be changed remotely at any time by whoever controls that repository.
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Backdoor / remote accessFind it
Search your lockfiles and build artifacts for my-auto-follow (8 malicious versions).
If you installed it — respond
my-auto-follow establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.
Did it already run?
If my-auto-follow was installed, its post-install payload may already have run. Removing the package does not undo that — check outbound connections and credential use from the install window onward.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- pkgwarden · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks my-auto-follow-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the C2 callback and severs the channel.