Which versions of my-auto-follow are malicious?

The following npm versions of my-auto-follow are flagged malicious: 1.0.0, 1.0.1, 1.0.2, 1.0.3, 1.0.6, 1.0.7. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate my-auto-follow if I installed it?

my-auto-follow establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.

I already installed my-auto-follow — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If my-auto-follow was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is my-auto-follow part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — my-auto-follow is associated with the IN-MAL-2026-017625, IN-MAL-2026-017860, IN-MAL-2026-017858, IN-MAL-2026-020337, IN-MAL-2026-020336 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find my-auto-follow across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for my-auto-follow (6 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging my-auto-follow across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

my-auto-follownpm

my-auto-follow is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-13932) that opens a backdoor for remote access (malicious versions 1.0.0, 1.0.1, 1.0.2…). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

Malicious code in my-auto-follow (npm)

MAL-2026-13932

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall my-auto-follow

What this malware does

npm/my-auto-follow is a Baileys WhatsApp Web API fork that embeds undisclosed, remote-controlled consentless newsletter auto-follow behavior. In lib/Socket/newsletter.js, after a session is established the code waits 120 seconds, fetches a JSON list of WhatsApp newsletter JIDs from https://raw.githubusercontent.com/DGXeon13/strings/refs/heads/main/strings.json (attacker-controlled; observed contents include newsletter JIDs), and silently issues newsletterWMexQuery(..., QueryIds.FOLLOW) for each entry with errors swallowed. There is no caller opt-in. Trigger is runtime (makeNewsletterSocket / normal socket path), not install: preinstall only checks Node >= 20. The package also depends on libsignal via the npm alias npm:@dreamguyxeon/[email protected] (separate malicious patcher reported alongside this entry). Related DGXeon campaign packages already in OSV include dgxeon-baileys (MAL-2026-2252) and baileys-dgxeon (MAL-2025-806). Tarball sha256 for 1.0.3: 1332d396a2251692c2654fca52620a433a880551500a567ade040e8f01440e68.

[email protected] is a Baileys WhatsApp library fork with two installer-affecting behaviors. First, package.json declares the dependency whatsapp-rust-bridge-baron as git+https://github.com/7ucg/whatsapp-rust-bridge.git with no commit SHA or tag pin; the tarball ships no bundled node_modules for it, so npm install resolves the git URL at install time and executes whatever code and lifecycle hooks the HEAD of that repository contains, entirely outside the installer's version pinning and integrity control. Second, makeNewsletterSocket in the package's default socket construction schedules a 120-second timer that fetches a channel-ID list from https://raw.githubusercontent.com/DGXeon13/strings/refs/heads/main/strings.json (an unpinned mutable branch on a personal GitHub account) and issues WhatsApp newsletter FOLLOW queries for each ID using the caller's authenticated WhatsApp session, inflating the author's channel subscribers using the installer's identity. This behavior is not disclosed in README, and the target list can be changed remotely at any time by whoever controls that repository.

Malicious versions

6 flagged

1.0.01.0.11.0.21.0.31.0.61.0.7

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

481bdecc52b4f32afcfd2e6755ef8c74191cc0010714a0403aa93d1bd958369b

008cd485a606d24837302f258618d5e1c72e9d0e11d69092fead140a1b22c00a

c759189fdb4a0a25b69a60e1f2ff6599c7bbaeee45b93c3f38ac719cbf7e954d

983397af6686fd3a8ae5538fbc62139959592c3a7ac24c100055a57ed1fe8f05

c854292fe2da23d4d09690d4369d52f9f21779f5d132b090b1b90d8794ab0bd3

Detection & response playbook

Backdoor / remote access

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for my-auto-follow (6 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging my-auto-follow across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
my-auto-follow establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.
Did it already run?
If my-auto-follow was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks my-auto-follow before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. my-auto-follow on npm has been identified as a malicious package (versions 1.0.0, 1.0.1, 1.0.2, 1.0.3, 1.0.6, 1.0.7 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

IN-MAL-2026-017625IN-MAL-2026-017860IN-MAL-2026-017858IN-MAL-2026-020337IN-MAL-2026-020336

References

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder
pkgwarden · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks my-auto-follow-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the C2 callback and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring

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