mutex-threadnpm
mutex-thread is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-14185) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious version 1.3.0). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in mutex-thread (npm)
What this malware does
The package presents itself as a mutex library but lib/Mutex.js contains an injected branch in runExclusive that, when a caller passes callback.meta.jobId === 'cross-chain-transfer', spawns lib/withLoad.min.js as a detached node child with stdio ignored and windowsHide true. lib/withLoad.min.js is a hex/base64-obfuscated dropper that reads an encrypted key from a Sepolia Ethereum smart contract (via eth-sepolia.g.alchemy.com and sepolia.infura.io RPC endpoints), derives a shared secret, decrypts payloads hosted on the contract, writes them to disk, chmods 755, and re-spawns node on them. Before entering its command loop it collects host reconnaissance (os.platform, release, arch, hostname, cpus, totalmem, freemem, uptime) and posts it to a hardcoded Slack bot via slack.com/api/chat.postMessage and to a hardcoded Telegram bot at api.telegram.org/bot<token>/sendMessage. lib/tryLoad.min.d.js polls slack.com/api/conversations.history every ~10 seconds with a hardcoded bearer token and channel id, reassembles chunked messages, AES-GCM-decrypts them using a key passed via argv, writes the plaintext to withLoad.min.js, chmods 755, and spawns node on it; an 'exitexitexit' sentinel triggers self-deletion of loader files and killing of a peer PID. String-array rotation and base64 wrapping are used to hide C2 hosts, bot tokens, channel ids, and the Sepolia contract address.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for mutex-thread (version 1.3.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging mutex-thread across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
mutex-thread is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If mutex-thread was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks mutex-thread before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks mutex-thread-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.