Which versions of mutex-forge are malicious?

The following npm versions of mutex-forge are flagged malicious: 2.0.0, 2.0.1, 2.0.2. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate mutex-forge if I installed it?

mutex-forge establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.

I already installed mutex-forge — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If mutex-forge was installed, its post-install payload may already have run. Removing the package does not undo that — check outbound connections and credential use from the install window onward.

Is mutex-forge part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — mutex-forge is associated with the IN-MAL-2026-017638, IN-MAL-2026-017636, GHSA-2gqm-6m3p-62g5, IN-MAL-2026-017801 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find mutex-forge across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Search your lockfiles and build artifacts for mutex-forge (3 malicious versions).

Malicious package

mutex-forgenpm

Advisory published Aug 13, 2026Updated Aug 14, 2026

mutex-forge is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-13955) that opens a backdoor for remote access (malicious versions 2.0.0, 2.0.1, 2.0.2). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

Malicious code in mutex-forge (npm)

MAL-2026-13955

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall mutex-forge

What this malware does

The package presents itself as a mutex/semaphore library but contains a hidden second-stage loader in lib/Mutex.js. When runExclusive is invoked with a callback carrying meta.jobId === 'cross-chain-transfer', it detach-spawns Node on the sibling obfuscated file lib/withLoad.min.js. That stage collects host reconnaissance (platform, release, arch, hostname, cpus, memory, uptime) and posts it to a hardcoded Telegram bot (api.telegram.org, chat -1003952553968) and a hardcoded Slack channel (slack.com chat.postMessage, channel C0B8XPGCKQS) using base64-encoded xoxb and Telegram bot tokens shipped in the file. It then connects to Ethereum Sepolia via Alchemy (eth-sepolia.g.alchemy.com) and Infura (sepolia.infura.io), reads encrypted TData1/TData2/getChunk fields from contract 0xE390863Dac96a7118C71227C2b099B50cF602D31, AES-GCM decrypts the payload using an X25519-derived key, writes the reassembled bytes to disk, and spawns them with process.execPath detached. A third stage (lib/tryLoad.min.d.js) polls slack.com/api/conversations.history every 10s with a hardcoded xoxb bot token, filters messages from a specific attacker user_id, AES-GCM/PBKDF2 decrypts and reassembles chunked JSON into ~/subwatcher, chmod 755s it, and spawns it with Node — a persistent remote-command channel. The loader then unlinks lib/withLoad.min.js, lib/withLoad.min.d.js, and lib/tryLoad.min.d.js, rewrites lib/Mutex.js to strip the malicious branch (lines 25..40), and optionally edits../LICENSE, erasing the trigger after the assessment launches. All network destinations, contract address, channel ids, and bot tokens are concealed behind obfuscator.io-style rotated string arrays and base64. Live third-party Slack (xoxb-11307403103236-..., xoxb-11301867762550-...) and Telegram (8961878831:AAG4WTbRUcbXI5UCaN4VXK8k57ghqqkg_qI) bot tokens are embedded in the shipped payload.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

Malicious versions

3 flagged

2.0.02.0.12.0.2

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

80f0f894a48e67fcc5d8ffb27da45f0f927244406d6c46fa9e0ee3aa5357caca

d3e6d6c8a6e7f9463fa8a07604b4699b1dba8415ee6759e3145b0cab183f4421

3de0a9fa65df037ea65a1ecebdf98528c3733f77e524b21f4c28358262f7cd12

6ca08ce9c4002505be076822d267ee38d4eb281bdce138c335f19bf3ef6cda8f

Detection & response playbook

Backdoor / remote access

Find it
Search your lockfiles and build artifacts for mutex-forge (3 malicious versions).
If you installed it — respond
mutex-forge establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.
Did it already run?
If mutex-forge was installed, its post-install payload may already have run. Removing the package does not undo that — check outbound connections and credential use from the install window onward.

Frequently asked questions

No. mutex-forge on npm has been identified as a malicious package (versions 2.0.0, 2.0.1, 2.0.2 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

IN-MAL-2026-017638IN-MAL-2026-017636GHSA-2gqm-6m3p-62g5IN-MAL-2026-017801

References

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks mutex-forge-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the C2 callback and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring

Explore

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