mutex-forgenpm
mutex-forge is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-13955) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious versions 2.0.1, 2.0.2). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in mutex-forge (npm)
What this malware does
The package presents itself as a mutex/semaphore library but contains a hidden second-stage loader in lib/Mutex.js. When runExclusive is invoked with a callback carrying meta.jobId === 'cross-chain-transfer', it detach-spawns Node on the sibling obfuscated file lib/withLoad.min.js. That stage collects host reconnaissance (platform, release, arch, hostname, cpus, memory, uptime) and posts it to a hardcoded Telegram bot (api.telegram.org, chat -1003952553968) and a hardcoded Slack channel (slack.com chat.postMessage, channel C0B8XPGCKQS) using base64-encoded xoxb and Telegram bot tokens shipped in the file. It then connects to Ethereum Sepolia via Alchemy (eth-sepolia.g.alchemy.com) and Infura (sepolia.infura.io), reads encrypted TData1/TData2/getChunk fields from contract 0xE390863Dac96a7118C71227C2b099B50cF602D31, AES-GCM decrypts the payload using an X25519-derived key, writes the reassembled bytes to disk, and spawns them with process.execPath detached. A third stage (lib/tryLoad.min.d.js) polls slack.com/api/conversations.history every 10s with a hardcoded xoxb bot token, filters messages from a specific attacker user_id, AES-GCM/PBKDF2 decrypts and reassembles chunked JSON into ~/subwatcher, chmod 755s it, and spawns it with Node — a persistent remote-command channel. The loader then unlinks lib/withLoad.min.js, lib/withLoad.min.d.js, and lib/tryLoad.min.d.js, rewrites lib/Mutex.js to strip the malicious branch (lines 25..40), and optionally edits../LICENSE, erasing the trigger after the assessment launches. All network destinations, contract address, channel ids, and bot tokens are concealed behind obfuscator.io-style rotated string arrays and base64. Live third-party Slack (xoxb-11307403103236-..., xoxb-11301867762550-...) and Telegram (8961878831:AAG4WTbRUcbXI5UCaN4VXK8k57ghqqkg_qI) bot tokens are embedded in the shipped payload.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for mutex-forge (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging mutex-forge across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
mutex-forge is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If mutex-forge was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks mutex-forge before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks mutex-forge-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.