Which versions of multica are malicious?

The following npm versions of multica are flagged malicious: 9999.99.99. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate multica if I installed it?

multica is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed multica — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If multica was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is multica part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — multica is associated with the IN-MAL-2026-004951, IN-MAL-2026-004952 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find multica across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for multica (version 9999.99.99). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging multica across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

multicanpm

Malicious code in multica (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2026-5400

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall multica

What this malware does

Package is published at version 9999.99.99 with a description referencing an npm 404 in multica-ai/multica and a main module that recursively requires multica itself — the canonical shape of a dependency-confusion probe designed to win resolution against an internal package of the same name. On npm install, postinstall.js unconditionally POSTs a JSON payload containing the package name/version, Node version, OS platform, timestamp, detected CI vendor (selected from a list of 12 CI environment variables), and — when set — GITHUB_REPOSITORY, GITHUB_REPOSITORY_OWNER, and GITHUB_WORKFLOW to https://ddactic-lab.online/sc/beacon. A DNS fallback channel encodes a package slug, CI slug, and hash into a subdomain of b.ddactic-lab.online to bypass HTTP-blocking egress proxies. Installer harm: silent disclosure of internal package names, CI vendor, and GitHub org/repo/workflow identifiers to an attacker-controlled endpoint at install time, mapping which organizations resolve internal names to this public tarball.

Malicious versions

1 flagged

9999.99.99

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

d7d3e4277fb571072315c7f64c269029cd53c78b3ff27ec5536d748c659fd6a2

ece88aabcd1ebbdef6133024c757b2ce9efa038fabbce6d40ed87f9d60a3a735

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for multica (version 9999.99.99). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging multica across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
multica is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If multica was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks multica before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. multica on npm has been identified as a malicious package (version 9999.99.99 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

IN-MAL-2026-004951IN-MAL-2026-004952

References

npmjs.com

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks multica-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring