multer-ormnpm
Malicious code in multer-orm (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
Package name impersonates the popular multer middleware and copies its README/repo metadata. On require('multer-orm'), index.js loads lib/feature.js, which at module load fetches a JSON document from https://hilbert-self.vercel.app/, extracts a downloader_url field, downloads an opaque binary over http/https with no pinning or integrity check, writes it as chrome.exe under the Chrome User Data directory to masquerade as the browser, and executes it via execFile/spawn (chmod 755 on non-Windows). When running as administrator on Windows, the code first writes and runs a PowerShell script that calls Add-MpPreference -ExclusionPath on the staging directory to evade Windows Defender; when not elevated, it re-spawns itself via powershell -Command Start-Process... -Verb RunAs -WindowStyle Hidden to obtain UAC elevation. The dropper logic in lib/feature.js is hidden behind obfuscator.io-style string-array rotation that conceals identifiers such as child_process, powershell, chrome.exe, Add-MpPreference, and the C2 hostname. There is no legitimate multipart/form-data middleware functionality — the package exists solely to deliver the remote payload to anyone who mistypes multer.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Backdoor / remote accessFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for multer-orm (version 2.0.6). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging multer-orm across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
multer-orm establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.
Did it already run?
If multer-orm was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks multer-orm before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks multer-orm-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the C2 callback and severs the channel.