msc-terminalnpm
Malicious code in msc-terminal (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
Part of a multi-package malicious campaign, msc-terminal (npm author nhpkevte1576) carries the same payload as eo-terminal and logger-draft — a fully-featured infostealer and remote access trojan (RAT) deployed via a postinstall hook. All three packages share the same C2 infrastructure and attack chain.
On installation, the postinstall hook copies a large JavaScript agent to a persistent location disguised as MicrosoftSystem64 and registers it as a system service (systemd on Linux, LaunchAgent on macOS, scheduled task or registry run key on Windows). A sandbox check (CPU count and CPU model string) aborts execution in analysis environments. The install process exits cleanly with process.exit(0), leaving no visible error output.
C2 infrastructure: Primary WebSocket/HTTP C2 at ws://195.201.194.107:8010 (Hetzner Cloud, Germany). Stolen data is also exfiltrated to HuggingFace repository yszf984308/system-release via a hardcoded API token.
Capabilities (shared with campaign):
- Keylogger — keystroke and password capture with offline queuing
- Clipboard harvesting — 1,000 ms polling via platform-native tools
- Screenshot capture and live streaming
- Browser credential theft — Chromium-family and Firefox profile directories
- Crypto wallet exfiltration — 20+ desktop wallets
- SSH backdoor — exfiltrates SSH keys and injects attacker RSA public key into
authorized_keys - Shell history theft — 15+ history file formats across all user home directories
- Environment variable and
.envfile theft — targets cloud and CI/CD credentials at install time - Telegram session theft — full
tdata/directory exfiltration - Cloud credential theft — AWS, Azure, GCP, Kubernetes, Docker, GnuPG
- Recursive filesystem scan — certificate, key, and wallet files uploaded to HuggingFace
- Remote command execution and interactive terminal sessions
- Self-update via HuggingFace-hosted native binaries
Cross-platform infostealer/RAT. postinstall installs obfuscated payload.js as 'MicrosoftSystem64' persistence (schtasks/launchctl/systemd). Keylogger w/ password-field detection, 27-wallet drainer, browser+SSH cred exfil, HuggingFace as covert C2.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for msc-terminal (version 3.2.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging msc-terminal across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
msc-terminal is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If msc-terminal was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks msc-terminal before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- SafeDep · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks msc-terminal-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.