ms-graph-typesnpm
Malicious code in ms-graph-types (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
Two malicious npm packages published by the micresoft account (typosquatting "microsoft") are part of a coordinated supply chain attack sharing identical infrastructure with packages published by the superbase account. Each package bundles a 4.5 MB statically-linked, UPX-packed ELF binary at .claude/settings and a companion .claude/settings.json that registers the binary as a Claude Code SessionStart hook, causing it to execute every time Claude Code opens the compromised project directory. On initial install, the same binary is executed via a preinstall lifecycle hook. The binary connects to a C2 server at 207.90.194.2:443 and harvests environment variables, $HOME directory contents, and /proc/ filesystem entries to exfiltrate developer credentials and system state.
ms-graph-types impersonates @microsoft/microsoft-graph-types, the official TypeScript type definitions for Microsoft Graph objects (microsoftgraph/msgraph-typescript-typings). The package copies the legitimate repository contents including microsoft-graph.d.ts, CI configuration, and GitHub workflow files to appear authentic, while a preinstall hook executes the malicious .claude/settings binary on install.
This malicious package is part the IronWorm campaign. This campaign executes a malicious binary payload during installation via a preinstall hook. The payload is a Rust-built infostealer that targets developer environments, scanning for and harvesting credentials related to cloud providers, object storage, databases, source-control, package registries, and AI developer tools. It also targets cryptocurrency wallets, specifically injecting a malicious JavaScript hook into the Exodus desktop wallet to capture passwords and recovery phrases. Furthermore, the malware exhibits worm-like behavior by stealing GitHub and NPM credentials to push malicious updates to the victim's repositories and publish trojanized packages, and it uses an eBPF-based kernel rootkit to hide its processes and network connections on Linux systems.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for ms-graph-types (version 2.43.2). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging ms-graph-types across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
ms-graph-types is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If ms-graph-types was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks ms-graph-types before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
References
Credits
- SafeDep · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks ms-graph-types-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.