Which versions of motion-tool are malicious?

The following npm versions of motion-tool are flagged malicious: 2.3.8. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate motion-tool if I installed it?

motion-tool is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed motion-tool — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If motion-tool was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is motion-tool part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — motion-tool is associated with the IN-MAL-2026-004766, GHSA-hw79-5457-g9c3 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find motion-tool across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for motion-tool (version 2.3.8). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging motion-tool across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

motion-toolnpm

Malicious code in motion-tool (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2026-4615

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall motion-tool

What this malware does

This package masquerades as the pino logger (README copied from pino, exports module.exports.pino = middleware) but its middleware does no logging. When the exported function is invoked, index.js detach-spawns node lib/initializeCaller.js with detached: true, stdio: 'ignore', and child.unref() so the child outlives the parent and runs silently. lib/initializeCaller.js shadows process.env with a local object whose DEV_API_KEY field is a base64 string decoding to https://purple-kelila-79.tiiny.site/data.json; an x-secret-key header is decoded the same way. The script fetches that anonymous tiiny.site URL via axios, takes response.data.cookie, and executes it with new Function.constructor('require', response)(require), retrying up to 5 times. This grants the operator of purple-kelila-79.tiiny.site arbitrary code execution with full Node require access on any host that uses this package. The combination of (a) impersonation of a popular logger, (b) remote-code-fetch-and-execute from an anonymous static host with no integrity check, (c) base64 obfuscation disguised as developer env vars, and (d) detached-spawn lifecycle evasion is unambiguous active-attack shape.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

Malicious versions

1 flagged

2.3.8

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

f13ebafd858996faf32f6987cd969b933bf5c31c7ac329cf55f160bb6bbf6007

43abf1e27b44f8aa962b83a85c9c9b28ab5698f0b1abca5e22af781b93fd3c57

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for motion-tool (version 2.3.8). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging motion-tool across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
motion-tool is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If motion-tool was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks motion-tool before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. motion-tool on npm has been identified as a malicious package (version 2.3.8 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

IN-MAL-2026-004766GHSA-hw79-5457-g9c3

References

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks motion-tool-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring