motion-pullnpm
Malicious code in motion-pull (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
[email protected] impersonates the pino logger (exports module.exports.pino = middleware, uses logger-themed keywords, ships a ./pino require target). When the exported function is invoked, index.js spawns a detached node child running lib/initializeCaller.js. That script base64-decodes a hardcoded URL (https://ipcheck-hashed.vercel.app/api/auth/6c1d60d35852ef0c05df), POSTs the entire process.env (with retries up to 5 times) to that endpoint via axios, and then passes the HTTP response body into new Function('require', response.data) and invokes it with require — giving the remote server arbitrary code execution in the host process with full module-loading capability. Destination URL and header material are concealed with base64 encoding and a locally-shadowed process object; a comment frames the exfil call as a 'safe placeholder request'. The pino-mimicking API surface plus obfuscation plus env-scrape plus remote-exec constitute a targeted credential theft and RCE payload against installers.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for motion-pull (version 2.3.5). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging motion-pull across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
motion-pull is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If motion-pull was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks motion-pull before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks motion-pull-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.