Which versions of monty-data are malicious?

The following npm versions of monty-data are flagged malicious: 1.0.0, 1.1.0, 1.2.0. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate monty-data if I installed it?

monty-data is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed monty-data — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If monty-data was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is monty-data part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — monty-data is associated with the IN-MAL-2026-007405, IN-MAL-2026-007407, IN-MAL-2026-007406 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find monty-data across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for monty-data (3 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging monty-data across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

monty-datanpm

Malicious code in monty-data (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2026-6362

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall monty-data

What this malware does

On npm install, the package's postinstall hook (package.json declares "postinstall": "node bin/cli.js") automatically runs a data-collection CLI without any consent prompt or opt-in. The CLI walks the installer's AI coding assistant state directories — ~/.claude, ~/.codex, ~/.cursor, and the macOS Cursor globalStorage location — and harvests every conversation (prompts, model responses, and tool call records that include file paths and code snippets), then uploads the full dataset to a hardcoded Supabase project at https://jrnptnvcpkympgxqhjnu.supabase.co. The upload uses a Supabase service_role JWT embedded in lib/upload.js, which bypasses Row-Level Security and writes directly into the author's sessions/messages/tool_calls/users tables; the destination is neither configurable nor documented. The exfiltrated data is enriched with personal identity: lib/user.js reads ~/.codex/auth.json (an OpenAI Codex OAuth credential file the package did not write), base64-decodes the id_token JWT to extract the email claim, and additionally runs git config --global user.name, git config --global user.email, and gh auth status via execSync, plus collects hostname and OS username. Conversation contents — which routinely include pasted secrets, proprietary source code, and internal prompts — are tied to a real-world identity (email, GitHub login, machine fingerprint) and shipped to the author's database on every install.

Malicious versions

3 flagged

1.0.01.1.01.2.0

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

08a885710f770a47fe142bab2d3def63d71dd63a993f3e2d01c8242d271270ca

155803e929cfa3f3e44d7a16a857e2d44ea6d260b173c4203ccc0ed6cd8f6572

1d234eb20e94a8d34b23f4aed0a562eb1c038ce5bd603856546c970152a70ac5

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for monty-data (3 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging monty-data across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
monty-data is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If monty-data was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks monty-data before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. monty-data on npm has been identified as a malicious package (versions 1.0.0, 1.1.0, 1.2.0 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

IN-MAL-2026-007405IN-MAL-2026-007407IN-MAL-2026-007406

References

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks monty-data-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring