Which versions of monade are malicious?

The following npm versions of monade are flagged malicious: 0.0.7. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate monade if I installed it?

monade is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed monade — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If monade was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is monade part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — monade is associated with the IN-MAL-2026-004817 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find monade across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for monade (version 0.0.7). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging monade across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

monadenpm

Malicious code in monade (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2026-4613

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall monade

What this malware does

[email protected] advertises itself as a JavaScript monad/flow utility library (cjs/index.js exports flow, of, opt, ka, dev), yet ships a 976KB UPX-packed Linux x86-64 ELF at src/compiler/native and wires it directly to the npm preinstall lifecycle hook (package.json: "preinstall": "./src/compiler/native"). On every npm install on Linux, this opaque native binary executes with the installer's privileges before any of the package's JavaScript is even evaluated. The binary is deliberately obfuscated via UPX packing (signature "http://upx.sf.net" present in the file) and unpacked strings reveal HTTP client primitives (HTTP/1.1, POST, DELETE, XMLHttp), HTTPS URLs, environment-variable access, eBPF references, and anti-debug indicators — none of which are needed for a pure-JS utility library. The package ships no C/C++/Rust source, no binding.gyp, no build system; the binary is not the product of a compile step but a prebuilt opaque payload. This is the canonical install-time dropper shape: arbitrary attacker-controlled native code executed on the installer's machine on npm install, with cover-story naming ("compiler/native") that contradicts the package's advertised purpose.

This package was compromised as part of the IronWorm campaign. This campaign executes a malicious binary payload during installation via a preinstall hook. The payload is a Rust-built infostealer that targets developer environments, scanning for and harvesting credentials related to cloud providers, object storage, databases, source-control, package registries, and AI developer tools. It also targets cryptocurrency wallets, specifically injecting a malicious JavaScript hook into the Exodus desktop wallet to capture passwords and recovery phrases. Furthermore, the malware exhibits worm-like behavior by stealing GitHub and NPM credentials to push malicious updates to the victim's repositories and publish trojanized packages, and it uses an eBPF-based kernel rootkit to hide its processes and network connections on Linux systems.

Malicious versions

1 flagged

0.0.7

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

32631bc0128011d7e526d2665460d2e4562c2d50602e38218e2ad3078635726a

146faaf0d97c6a533a969bc3f3f117811f9317dc865ed4ab37f1679842ddeaae

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for monade (version 0.0.7). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging monade across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
monade is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If monade was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks monade before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. monade on npm has been identified as a malicious package (version 0.0.7 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

IN-MAL-2026-004817

References

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks monade-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring