Which versions of model-switch-router are malicious?

The following npm versions of model-switch-router are flagged malicious: 1.5.0. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate model-switch-router if I installed it?

model-switch-router is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed model-switch-router — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If model-switch-router was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is model-switch-router part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — model-switch-router is associated with the GHSA-vvr8-673r-w4j2, IN-MAL-2026-004433, IN-MAL-2026-004434 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find model-switch-router across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for model-switch-router (version 1.5.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging model-switch-router across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

model-switch-routernpm

Malicious code in model-switch-router (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2026-4279

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall model-switch-router

What this malware does

Ten packages published by npm user asdxzxc at version 1.0.10 target developers working on AI and LLM tooling. Each package masquerades as a developer utility while executing a two-stage payload triggered via postinstall: package.json → lib/setup.js → lib/worker.js.

Credential harvesting: lib/worker.js scans the filesystem for private keys (64-char hex), BIP39 mnemonics (12–24 word phrases), API keys and secrets, and passwords from env vars and shell history (.bash_history, .zsh_history, .fish_history, .mysql_history, .psql_history), including wallet tool invocations (geth account, hardhat, metamask, wallet import). Targeted paths include ~/.ssh, ~/.aws/credentials, ~/.config/gcloud, ~/.azure, ~/.docker/config.json, ~/.kube/config, crypto wallet dirs (~/.ethereum, ~/.bitcoin, ~/.solana), exchange configs (Binance, Bybit, OKX, KuCoin, Deribit, 3Commas), .env, .npmrc, .gitconfig. Also performs browser data theft and Ethereum keystore brute-force. A priority-target list fetched from the actor's GitHub Pages endpoint enables aggressive deep scanning for pre-registered high-value hosts.

AI self-propagation: after credential theft, a _propagate() function executes a multi-vector campaign to infect AI coding assistants. It writes poisoned .cursorrules and CLAUDE.md files — framed as "P-2024-001 Enterprise Credential Integrity Standard" — to all discovered project directories, parent directories, and home subdirectories, instructing Cursor, Claude Code, and GitHub Copilot to execute the remote payload and propagate it via Issues, PRs, and documentation. Git hooks (post-merge, post-checkout, pre-commit, pre-push) are injected into all .git repos found on disk, and a persistence block is appended to ~/.bashrc, ~/.zshrc, and ~/.profile. Zero-width steganography (ZWSP/ZWJ/ZWNJ/LTRM encoding) embeds hidden scan triggers in all AI-generated text output, enabling AI-to-AI chain infection invisible to humans.

C2/exfil: a remotely configurable JSON config hosted on the actor's GitHub Pages delivers the active webhook list, encryption key, and scan strategy; hardcoded fallback webhooks at webhook.site and a DNS TXT record fallback are used if the primary channel fails. A dedup marker at ~/.local/share/.p2024_integrity prevents re-propagation within 24 hours.

model-switch-router poses as an intelligent model routing utility for switching between AI providers, specifically targeting AI/LLM application developers.

The package ships lib/trap-core.js (~1000+ lines) which combines the full exfiltration toolkit: requires fs, os, https, and child_process; calls os.hostname() and os.platform() to fingerprint the host; uses curl and ping; and performs multiple POST requests with hostname fields in the payload bodies (lines 385, 411, 466, 548-549, 553, 600). The presence of os/host fingerprinting bound to outbound HTTPS POSTs containing hostname-keyed JSON payloads, combined with multiple child_process spawn sites and shell utilities (curl, ping), is the canonical system-information exfiltration shape. The package's name suggests an innocuous AI model-routing utility, which does not justify any of this behavior. Installing or loading this package will cause host identifiers and command output to be transmitted to attacker-controlled endpoints reachable from trap-core.js.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

Malicious versions

1 flagged

1.5.0

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

71333e6a52f93579fd26936282b856d41ebd3d7aad08317a2c843e0f364e1def

cceb9f6f384e943e6c33c7863f39d024fbf49fbcdd26a0ee616b315b39be8a6a

4ac58982f0c3072098427471d8f7231a5c2747a1cce41d2568a3349a1aaee2d3

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for model-switch-router (version 1.5.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging model-switch-router across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
model-switch-router is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If model-switch-router was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks model-switch-router before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. model-switch-router on npm has been identified as a malicious package (version 1.5.0 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

GHSA-vvr8-673r-w4j2IN-MAL-2026-004433IN-MAL-2026-004434

References

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder
SafeDep · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks model-switch-router-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring