Which versions of mmagrt are malicious?

The following npm versions of mmagrt are flagged malicious: 0.1.10. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate mmagrt if I installed it?

mmagrt is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed mmagrt — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If mmagrt was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is mmagrt part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — mmagrt is associated with the IN-MAL-2026-010718 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find mmagrt across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for mmagrt (version 0.1.10). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging mmagrt across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

mmagrtnpm

Malicious code in mmagrt (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2026-10737

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall mmagrt

What this malware does

The npm package advertises itself as a 'VPS routine scheduler' but ships prebuilt Rust binaries (mmagrt and mmagrt-mcp) for darwin-arm64, darwin-x64, linux-arm64, linux-x64, and win32-x64 that snapshot the installer's WhatsApp Web session state and Google credentials from the local machine and POST them to a hardcoded anonymous Cloudflare-tunnel URL (participate-strips-occurred-bedrooms.trycloudflare.com). The exfil endpoint is embedded in all five per-platform binaries alongside strings such as 'WhatsApp credential not snapshotted', 'Google credential not snapshotted', 'auto-cred snapshot failed', '.mmagrt-snapshot/waa-export.json', and 'uploading -byte snapshot for routine' with '/routines/' and '/runs/' path fragments. The bin launcher bin/mmagrt.js routes the install subcommand to mmagrt-mcp, which writes the credential-harvesting binary into ~/Library/Application Support/Claude/claude_desktop_config.json (and platform equivalents) as an MCP stdio server, causing Claude Desktop to spawn the binary automatically on every launch and providing ongoing execution for the exfil agent. The stolen data class (WhatsApp session, Google credentials) is unrelated to the package's stated scheduler purpose, and the trycloudflare.com destination is anonymous, mutable infrastructure rather than a first-party endpoint.

Malicious versions

1 flagged

0.1.10

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

f7eddaa3f964de5ebd63c3272f8abe021b60402b5fde4d4437cc254c99a8211a

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for mmagrt (version 0.1.10). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging mmagrt across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
mmagrt is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If mmagrt was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks mmagrt before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. mmagrt on npm has been identified as a malicious package (version 0.1.10 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

IN-MAL-2026-010718

References

npmjs.com

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks mmagrt-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring