Which versions of midcorp are malicious?

The following npm versions of midcorp are flagged malicious: 1.1.9. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate midcorp if I installed it?

midcorp establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.

I already installed midcorp — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If midcorp was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is midcorp part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — midcorp is associated with the IN-MAL-2026-004224 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find midcorp across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for midcorp (version 1.1.9). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging midcorp across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

midcorpnpm

Malicious code in midcorp (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2026-4610

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall midcorp

What this malware does

The package masquerades as a pino-compatible logger (package.json keywords fast/logger/stream/json, exports module.exports.pino = middleware, lib filenames proto.js, redaction.js, multistream.js, transport.js, worker.js mirror pino's layout), but its actual runtime behavior is a remote-code-execution dropper. When a consumer requires midcorp and invokes the exported middleware() from index.js, a detached/unref'd child process spawns lib/caller.js, which performs axios.get against https://jsonkeeper.com/b/XRGF3 (an anonymous, mutable paste-bin host) and passes the returned data.cookie field to new Function.constructor('require', s)(require) — handing attacker-controlled JavaScript full Node.js require capabilities. The C2 URL is obfuscated as a base64 string disguised as a fake process.env.DEV_API_KEY default in lib/caller.js / lib/const.js (aHR0cHM6Ly9qc29ua2VlcGVyLmNvbS9iL1hSR0Yz → https://jsonkeeper.com/b/XRGF3), with a backup paste ID (4NAKK). The description field is unrelated boilerplate about vulnerability management. Three independent block signals (remote-eval of paste-bin content, pino impersonation cover, base64-hidden C2) leave no benign interpretation.

Malicious versions

1 flagged

1.1.9

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

bc6725ed066ed5aff9452bd82d278fd89c1548768124d8b89cb8e5a5e8c3b05a

Detection & response playbook

Backdoor / remote access

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for midcorp (version 1.1.9). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging midcorp across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
midcorp establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.
Did it already run?
If midcorp was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks midcorp before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. midcorp on npm has been identified as a malicious package (version 1.1.9 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

IN-MAL-2026-004224

References

npmjs.com

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks midcorp-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the C2 callback and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring