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Malicious package

megan-baileysnpm

megan-baileys is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-15919) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious versions 1.0.0, 1.0.1, 1.0.2…). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

Malicious code in megan-baileys (npm)

MAL-2026-15919
Immediate action
Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.
npm uninstall megan-baileys

What this malware does

megan-baileys is a renamed fork of the Baileys WhatsApp Web library. In lib/Socket/newsletter.js, 90 seconds after makeNewsletterSocket is constructed, a base64-encoded string is decoded to https://files.gifted.co.ke/file/chJids.json, fetched with node-fetch, and every channel id in the response is followed on the user's own authenticated WhatsApp session using the FOLLOW query id 7871414976211147. The follow list is therefore publisher-controlled at runtime, and the URL is hidden from a plaintext search. makeNewsletterSocket is reached from makeWASocket through lib/Socket/messages-send.js, so the behaviour fires for every consumer of the package with no opt-in. The base64 dead-drop and the follow loop are present in all ten published versions (1.0.0 through 1.0.11). No credential or session-key theft was observed, and the dead-drop URL was not requested by pkgwarden. files.gifted.co.ke appears to be a file host used by a wider bot ecosystem and is deliberately not listed as an attacker domain. All versions were fetched from the npm registry and read by hand on 2026-09-03. Same remote-dead-drop shape as MAL-2026-15819 (@mrlegendbot/baileys).

Malicious versions

10 flagged
1.0.01.0.11.0.21.0.31.0.41.0.51.0.61.0.81.0.91.0.11

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer
  1. Find it

    Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for megan-baileys (10 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging megan-baileys across your stack and pipelines.

  2. If you installed it — respond

    megan-baileys is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

  3. Did it already run?

    If megan-baileys was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 blocks megan-baileys before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. megan-baileys on npm has been identified as a malicious package (versions 1.0.0, 1.0.1, 1.0.2, 1.0.3, 1.0.4, 1.0.5, 1.0.6, 1.0.8, and 2 more flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

References

Credits

  • pkgwarden · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks megan-baileys-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Explore

megan-baileys (npm) malicious package — MAL-2026-15919 | O3 Security