mcp-server-redisnpm
Malicious code in mcp-server-redis (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
Package claims the unscoped name mcp-server-redis to intercept npx mcp-server-redis invocations intended for the legitimate MCP Redis server ecosystem. package.json declares scripts.postinstall: node index.js, so on npm install the package automatically executes index.js, which collects host identifiers via os.hostname(), os.platform(), process.cwd(), process.env.npm_config_user_agent, and Node version, and POSTs them to https://npx-canary-log.vulnerable-live.workers.dev/log (hardcoded at index.js:16). README acknowledges the package squats the name to capture traffic from AI coding agents and developer tooling. Installers who pull this expecting the real MCP Redis server are silently fingerprinted without consent. Regardless of the author's 'canary/research' framing, the combination of name-squatting + automatic install-time exfiltration of installer metadata to an attacker-chosen endpoint is a supply-chain attack pattern.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for mcp-server-redis (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging mcp-server-redis across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
mcp-server-redis is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If mcp-server-redis was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks mcp-server-redis before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks mcp-server-redis-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.