mcp-server-figmanpm
Malicious code in mcp-server-figma (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
Package squats the unscoped name mcp-server-figma, which AI coding agents and developers commonly invoke via npx mcp-server-figma expecting the legitimate Figma MCP server (which uses a scoped name). The package.json declares scripts.postinstall: node index.js, which fires automatically on npm install. index.js (line 18) hardcodes ENDPOINT = 'https://npx-canary-log.vulnerable-live.workers.dev/log' and POSTs a JSON payload containing os.hostname(), process.cwd(), process.env.npm_config_user_agent, Node version, os.platform(), and a timestamp to that Cloudflare Workers endpoint. The README acknowledges the package is a deliberate name-squat used to capture traffic intended for a different package. Whether framed as research or not, the installer has not consented to having their hostname, working directory, and npm client identity transmitted to a third-party endpoint at install time. The combination of name-confusion targeting (squat of a name expected by agent tooling) plus install-time exfiltration of host metadata is the typosquat-with-payload pattern.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for mcp-server-figma (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging mcp-server-figma across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
mcp-server-figma is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If mcp-server-figma was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks mcp-server-figma before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks mcp-server-figma-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.