Which versions of mazemap are malicious?

The following npm versions of mazemap are flagged malicious: 99.9.1. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate mazemap if I installed it?

Remove mazemap from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.

I already installed mazemap — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If mazemap was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is mazemap part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — mazemap is associated with the IN-MAL-2026-005033, IN-MAL-2026-005034, GHSA-xc8q-h68h-r6r9 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find mazemap across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for mazemap (version 99.9.1). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging mazemap across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

mazemapnpm

Malicious code in mazemap (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2026-5448

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall mazemap

What this malware does

package.json declares its only dependency ltidisafe as a direct HTTPS tarball URL (https://ltidi.storage.googleapis.com/depenconf/ltidisafe-3.0.2.tgz) hosted on a generic Google Cloud Storage bucket rather than resolved from the npm registry. On npm install mazemap, npm fetches and installs that arbitrary tarball, executing any lifecycle scripts (preinstall/install/postinstall) it contains — the tarball is bucket-owner-mutable and not subject to registry vetting. The package itself is a hollow lure: index.js is a 35-byte module.exports = {};, with no description, no author, ISC default license, and version 99.9.1 — a recognized dependency-confusion technique for overriding an internal package of the same name via a higher public version. The bucket path segment is literally depenconf. The combination of hollow main, inflated version, anonymous GCS-hosted dependency, and name collision with a real product (MazeMap) is a dependency-confusion / smuggling shape whose only on-install effect is to pull and execute attacker-controlled code from a non-registry source.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

Malicious versions

1 flagged

99.9.1

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

751317dcad79cec866b8dc69cd60b39e3be8e1bcc45746039835b04ce32445b0

ecccd07042bcd8a96f5ad7d2cdba5ecd1b36fac689210c4bdd4575b2d9a92cb6

b2544226891e60a2b6f33b0aacf3e4669fe4ce13220f01bd40a84c8657fe0518

Detection & response playbook

Malicious package

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for mazemap (version 99.9.1). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging mazemap across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
Remove mazemap from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.
Did it already run?
If mazemap was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks mazemap before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. mazemap on npm has been identified as a malicious package (version 99.9.1 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

IN-MAL-2026-005033IN-MAL-2026-005034GHSA-xc8q-h68h-r6r9

References

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks mazemap-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring